faction_promote

2 findings on this tool

1. mediumunconstrained inputf-r1-faction_promote

   Tool `faction_promote` accepts unconstrained string input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `player_id`, `role_id`, `session_id`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

   OWASP LLM01NIST MEASURE-2.3ATLAS T0051
2. mediumexcessive agencyf-r5-faction_promote

   Tool `faction_promote` description mentions money but no `money` side-effect is declared

   Description: "Promote or demote a faction member (player_id accepts a player ID or username. Leader can change any member's role. Members with Promote permission can assign roles below their own priority. Only the leader can transfer leadership (role_id=leader). Roles: recruit, member, officer, leader.)" -- this references money/payment/refund/etc., but the declared side_effects ([]) don't include `money`. A capframe-bind policy that relies on declared side_effects to scope spend caveats will under-scope this tool.

   fix: Add `money` to the tool's `side_effects` declaration, or rewrite the description to clarify that no actual money moves.

   OWASP LLM08NIST MEASURE-2.6ATLAS T0040