v0.2.0 · live
CAPFRAME
§ serverhttpfindings.v2

Hugging Face Hub MCP

https://huggingface.co/mcp

github.com/huggingface/hf-mcp-server

Score
A96
Findings
2
Tools
4
Last scan
2026-09-03

Severity breakdown

Critical0
High0
Medium2
Low0
Info0

Worst finding

Tool `hub_repo_search` accepts unconstrained string input

· hub_repo_search

The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `author`, `query`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

All 2 findings

  1. medium
    Tool `hub_repo_search` accepts unconstrained string input· hub_repo_searchunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `author`, `query`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  2. medium
    Tool `hub_repo_details` accepts unconstrained string input· hub_repo_detailsunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `config`, `split`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

How this was scored

Source http live HTTP MCP endpoint, classified against every rule. Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].

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