Hugging Face Hub MCP

All 3 findings

1. high
   Tool `hub_repo_details` accepts an unbounded monetary / quota value· hub_repo_detailsexcessive agency

   The numeric parameter(s) `limit` have a money/quota-shaped name but no `maximum` constraint. An LLM tricked by indirect-injection can call the tool with arbitrarily large values.

   fix: Add a `maximum` (and ideally `minimum`) to each money/quota numeric, OR enforce the cap via a capframe-bind `--limit` caveat at the agent boundary.

2. medium
   Tool `hub_repo_search` accepts unconstrained string input· hub_repo_searchunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `author`, `query`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

3. medium
   Tool `hub_repo_details` accepts unconstrained string input· hub_repo_detailsunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `config`, `split`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.