v0.2.0 · live
CAPFRAME
§ serverhttpfindings.v2

OpenZeppelin Cairo Contracts MCP

https://mcp.openzeppelin.com/contracts/cairo/mcp

Score
B86
Findings
7
Tools
8
Last scan
2026-06-05

Severity breakdown

Critical0
High0
Medium7
Low0
Info0

Worst finding

Tool `cairo-erc20` accepts unconstrained string input

· cairo-erc20

The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `appName`, `appVersion`, `decimals`, `name`, `premint`, `symbol`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

All 7 findings

  1. medium
    Tool `cairo-erc20` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-erc20unconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `appName`, `appVersion`, `decimals`, `name`, `premint`, `symbol`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  2. medium
    Tool `cairo-erc721` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-erc721unconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `appName`, `appVersion`, `baseUri`, `name`, `symbol`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  3. medium
    Tool `cairo-erc1155` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-erc1155unconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `baseUri`, `name`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  4. medium
    Tool `cairo-account` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-accountunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `name`, `type`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  5. medium
    Tool `cairo-multisig` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-multisigunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `name`, `quorum`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  6. medium
    Tool `cairo-vesting` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-vestingunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `cliffDuration`, `duration`, `name`, `schedule`, `startDate`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  7. medium
    Tool `cairo-custom` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-customunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `name`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

How this was scored

Source http live HTTP MCP endpoint, classified against every rule. Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].

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