zip1.io MCP

All 4 findings

1. high
   Tool `create_short_url` name implies a side effect that is not declared· create_short_urlexcessive agency

   `create_short_url` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

   fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

2. medium
   Tool `create_short_url` accepts unconstrained string input· create_short_urlunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `alias`, `description`, `expiration_time`, `password`, `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

3. medium
   Tool `get_url_stats` accepts unconstrained string input· get_url_statsunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `short_code`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

4. medium
   Tool `validate_url` accepts unconstrained string input· validate_urlunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.