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browserbase_stagehand_agent

on npm:@browserbasehq/mcp-server-browserbase@2.4.3

Severity

critical1
high0
medium1
low0
info0

2 findings on this tool

  1. criticalexcessive agencyf-r7-browserbase_stagehand_agent

    Tool `browserbase_stagehand_agent` exposes a code/command execution surface

    `browserbase_stagehand_agent` looks like it executes code or shell commands (Execute a task autonomously using Gemini Computer Use agent. The agent will navigate and interact with web pages to complete the given task.). Arbitrary execution is the maximal authority a tool can hold -- it subsumes every other caveat, so it should never be exposed to an agent without a hard sandbox and an explicit, narrowly-scoped capability.

    fix: Do not expose raw code/shell execution to an agent. If unavoidable, run it in a disposable sandbox with no network + no host FS, gate it behind a capframe-bind capability scoped to an allow-list of commands, and require holder-of-key proof per call.

    OWASP LLM08NIST MANAGE-2.2ATLAS T0051
  2. mediumunconstrained inputf-r1-browserbase_stagehand_agent

    Tool `browserbase_stagehand_agent` accepts unconstrained string input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `prompt`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

    OWASP LLM01NIST MEASURE-2.3ATLAS T0051

About this tool

browserbase_stagehand_agent is one of 9 tools exposed by Browserbase MCP. The server scored 72/100 overall against the capframe rule engine (source: sandbox). Last scanned 2026-06-05.

The findings above are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Disagree with one? Open an issue.