server-everything

All 7 findings

1. high
   Tool `toggle-subscriber-updates` name implies a side effect that is not declared· toggle-subscriber-updatesexcessive agency

   `toggle-subscriber-updates` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

   fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

2. medium
   Tool `echo` accepts unconstrained string input· echounconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `message`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

3. medium
   Tool `get-annotated-message` accepts unconstrained string input· get-annotated-messageunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `messageType`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

4. medium
   Tool `get-resource-reference` accepts unconstrained string input· get-resource-referenceunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `resourceType`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

5. medium
   Tool `get-structured-content` accepts unconstrained string input· get-structured-contentunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `location`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

6. medium
   Tool `gzip-file-as-resource` accepts unconstrained string input· gzip-file-as-resourceunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `data`, `name`, `outputType`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

7. medium
   Tool `simulate-research-query` accepts unconstrained string input· simulate-research-queryunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `topic`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.