server-puppeteer

All 8 findings

1. critical
   Tool `puppeteer_evaluate` exposes a code/command execution surface· puppeteer_evaluateexcessive agency

   `puppeteer_evaluate` looks like it executes code or shell commands (Execute JavaScript in the browser console). Arbitrary execution is the maximal authority a tool can hold -- it subsumes every other caveat, so it should never be exposed to an agent without a hard sandbox and an explicit, narrowly-scoped capability.

   fix: Do not expose raw code/shell execution to an agent. If unavoidable, run it in a disposable sandbox with no network + no host FS, gate it behind a capframe-bind capability scoped to an allow-list of commands, and require holder-of-key proof per call.

2. medium
   Tool `puppeteer_navigate` accepts unconstrained string input· puppeteer_navigateunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

3. medium
   Tool `puppeteer_screenshot` accepts unconstrained string input· puppeteer_screenshotunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `name`, `selector`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

4. medium
   Tool `puppeteer_click` accepts unconstrained string input· puppeteer_clickunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `selector`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

5. medium
   Tool `puppeteer_fill` accepts unconstrained string input· puppeteer_fillunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `selector`, `value`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

6. medium
   Tool `puppeteer_select` accepts unconstrained string input· puppeteer_selectunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `selector`, `value`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

7. medium
   Tool `puppeteer_hover` accepts unconstrained string input· puppeteer_hoverunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `selector`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

8. medium
   Tool `puppeteer_evaluate` accepts unconstrained string input· puppeteer_evaluateunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `script`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.