confirm_cost

2 findings on this tool

1. highexcessive agencyf-r4-confirm_cost

   Tool `confirm_cost` accepts an unbounded monetary / quota value

   The numeric parameter(s) `amount` have a money/quota-shaped name but no `maximum` constraint. An LLM tricked by indirect-injection can call the tool with arbitrarily large values.

   fix: Add a `maximum` (and ideally `minimum`) to each money/quota numeric, OR enforce the cap via a capframe-bind `--limit` caveat at the agent boundary.

   OWASP LLM08NIST MANAGE-2.2ATLAS T0051
2. mediumunconstrained inputf-r1-confirm_cost

   Tool `confirm_cost` accepts unconstrained string input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `recurrence`, `type`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

   OWASP LLM01NIST MEASURE-2.3ATLAS T0051