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CAPFRAME
§ serverregistryfindings.v2

mcp-server-mssql

pypi:mcp-server-mssql@0.1.0

github.com/daedalus/mcp-server-mssql

Score
C68
Findings
5
Tools
21
Last scan
2026-06-05

Severity breakdown

Critical2
High3
Medium0
Low0
Info0

Worst finding

Tool `execute_query` exposes a code/command execution surface

· execute_query

`execute_query` looks like it executes code or shell commands (Execute SQL query and return results). Arbitrary execution is the maximal authority a tool can hold -- it subsumes every other caveat, so it should never be exposed to an agent without a hard sandbox and an explicit, narrowly-scoped capability.

fix: Do not expose raw code/shell execution to an agent. If unavoidable, run it in a disposable sandbox with no network + no host FS, gate it behind a capframe-bind capability scoped to an allow-list of commands, and require holder-of-key proof per call.

All 5 findings

  1. critical
    Tool `execute_query` exposes a code/command execution surface· execute_queryexcessive agency

    `execute_query` looks like it executes code or shell commands (Execute SQL query and return results). Arbitrary execution is the maximal authority a tool can hold -- it subsumes every other caveat, so it should never be exposed to an agent without a hard sandbox and an explicit, narrowly-scoped capability.

    fix: Do not expose raw code/shell execution to an agent. If unavoidable, run it in a disposable sandbox with no network + no host FS, gate it behind a capframe-bind capability scoped to an allow-list of commands, and require holder-of-key proof per call.

  2. critical
    Tool `execute_scalar` exposes a code/command execution surface· execute_scalarexcessive agency

    `execute_scalar` looks like it executes code or shell commands (Execute SQL and return single value). Arbitrary execution is the maximal authority a tool can hold -- it subsumes every other caveat, so it should never be exposed to an agent without a hard sandbox and an explicit, narrowly-scoped capability.

    fix: Do not expose raw code/shell execution to an agent. If unavoidable, run it in a disposable sandbox with no network + no host FS, gate it behind a capframe-bind capability scoped to an allow-list of commands, and require holder-of-key proof per call.

  3. high
    Tool `set_connection_timeout` name implies a side effect that is not declared· set_connection_timeoutexcessive agency

    `set_connection_timeout` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

    fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

  4. high
    Tool `set_login_timeout` name implies a side effect that is not declared· set_login_timeoutexcessive agency

    `set_login_timeout` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

    fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

  5. high
    Tool `set_autocommit` name implies a side effect that is not declared· set_autocommitexcessive agency

    `set_autocommit` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

    fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

How this was scored

Source registry tool surface extracted from the package's README + manifest (R3/R5/R6/R7 fire; schema-dependent rules deferred). Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].

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