mcp-server-sqlite

All 9 findings

1. critical
   Tool `read_query` exposes a code/command execution surface· read_queryexcessive agency

   `read_query` looks like it executes code or shell commands (Execute a SELECT query on the SQLite database). Arbitrary execution is the maximal authority a tool can hold -- it subsumes every other caveat, so it should never be exposed to an agent without a hard sandbox and an explicit, narrowly-scoped capability.

   fix: Do not expose raw code/shell execution to an agent. If unavoidable, run it in a disposable sandbox with no network + no host FS, gate it behind a capframe-bind capability scoped to an allow-list of commands, and require holder-of-key proof per call.

2. critical
   Tool `write_query` exposes a code/command execution surface· write_queryexcessive agency

   `write_query` looks like it executes code or shell commands (Execute an INSERT, UPDATE, or DELETE query on the SQLite database). Arbitrary execution is the maximal authority a tool can hold -- it subsumes every other caveat, so it should never be exposed to an agent without a hard sandbox and an explicit, narrowly-scoped capability.

   fix: Do not expose raw code/shell execution to an agent. If unavoidable, run it in a disposable sandbox with no network + no host FS, gate it behind a capframe-bind capability scoped to an allow-list of commands, and require holder-of-key proof per call.

3. high
   Tool `write_query` name implies a side effect that is not declared· write_queryexcessive agency

   `write_query` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

   fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

4. high
   Tool `create_table` name implies a side effect that is not declared· create_tableexcessive agency

   `create_table` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

   fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

5. medium
   Tool `read_query` accepts unconstrained string input· read_queryunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `query`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

6. medium
   Tool `write_query` accepts unconstrained string input· write_queryunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `query`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

7. medium
   Tool `create_table` accepts unconstrained string input· create_tableunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `query`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

8. medium
   Tool `describe_table` accepts unconstrained string input· describe_tableunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `table_name`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

9. medium
   Tool `append_insight` accepts unconstrained string input· append_insightunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `insight`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.