tavily-mcp

All 10 findings

1. high
   Tool `tavily_crawl` accepts an unbounded monetary / quota value· tavily_crawlexcessive agency

   The numeric parameter(s) `limit` have a money/quota-shaped name but no `maximum` constraint. An LLM tricked by indirect-injection can call the tool with arbitrarily large values.

   fix: Add a `maximum` (and ideally `minimum`) to each money/quota numeric, OR enforce the cap via a capframe-bind `--limit` caveat at the agent boundary.

2. high
   Tool `tavily_crawl` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· tavily_crawlssrf surface

   The parameter(s) `url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.

   fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.

3. high
   Tool `tavily_map` accepts an unbounded monetary / quota value· tavily_mapexcessive agency

   The numeric parameter(s) `limit` have a money/quota-shaped name but no `maximum` constraint. An LLM tricked by indirect-injection can call the tool with arbitrarily large values.

   fix: Add a `maximum` (and ideally `minimum`) to each money/quota numeric, OR enforce the cap via a capframe-bind `--limit` caveat at the agent boundary.

4. high
   Tool `tavily_map` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· tavily_mapssrf surface

   The parameter(s) `url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.

   fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.

5. medium
   Tool `tavily_search` accepts unconstrained string input· tavily_searchunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `country`, `end_date`, `query`, `start_date`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

6. medium
   Tool `tavily_extract` accepts unconstrained string input· tavily_extractunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `query`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

7. medium
   Tool `tavily_crawl` accepts unconstrained string input· tavily_crawlunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `instructions`, `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

8. medium
   Tool `tavily_crawl` fetches external web content -- indirect-injection surface· tavily_crawlindirect injection

   Description: "Crawl a website starting from a URL. Extracts content from pages with configurable depth and breadth." -- this tool pulls externally-controlled content into the agent's context window, the canonical indirect-injection vector. Even when the user supplies the URL, content at that URL can carry hostile instructions.

   fix: Sandbox the fetched content: strip prompts before forwarding to the model, constrain to an allow-list of domains, and route through capframe-guard with a `domain in [...]` caveat.

9. medium
   Tool `tavily_map` accepts unconstrained string input· tavily_mapunconstrained input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `instructions`, `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

10. medium
    Tool `tavily_research` accepts unconstrained string input· tavily_researchunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `input`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.