tavily_crawl

3 findings on this tool

1. highexcessive agencyf-r4-tavily_crawl

   Tool `tavily_crawl` accepts an unbounded monetary / quota value

   The numeric parameter(s) `limit` have a money/quota-shaped name but no `maximum` constraint. An LLM tricked by indirect-injection can call the tool with arbitrarily large values.

   fix: Add a `maximum` (and ideally `minimum`) to each money/quota numeric, OR enforce the cap via a capframe-bind `--limit` caveat at the agent boundary.

   OWASP LLM08NIST MANAGE-2.2ATLAS T0051
2. mediumunconstrained inputf-r1-tavily_crawl

   Tool `tavily_crawl` accepts unconstrained string input

   The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `extract_depth`, `format`, `instructions`, `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

   fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

   OWASP LLM01NIST MEASURE-2.3ATLAS T0051
3. mediumindirect injectionf-r6-tavily_crawl

   Tool `tavily_crawl` fetches external web content -- indirect-injection surface

   Description: "Crawl a website starting from a URL. Extracts content from pages with configurable depth and breadth." -- this tool pulls externally-controlled content into the agent's context window, the canonical indirect-injection vector. Even when the user supplies the URL, content at that URL can carry hostile instructions.

   fix: Sandbox the fetched content: strip prompts before forwarding to the model, constrain to an allow-list of domains, and route through capframe-guard with a `domain in [...]` caveat.

   OWASP LLM01NIST MEASURE-2.3ATLAS T0051